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THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND  THE  CHALLENGE  OF  THE  WEST 
IN  THE  EIGHTIES 
-----
I  should  Like  to  begin  by  thanking  the  Deutsche 
Gesellschaft  FGr  Auswartige  Politik  for  its  kind  invitation. 
In  his  memoirs  Henry  Kissinger  writes  that  those  who  hold 
high  political  office  Live  off  their  intellectual  capital. 
They  are  so  busy  with  decisions  that  they  do  not  have  time 
to  think  through  and  rethink  their  basic  positions.  Although 
I  would  not  wish  to  compare  my  position  with  that  which 
Mr  Kissinger  held,  this  is  a  danger  of  which  I  am  very  much 
aware  and  is  one  of  the  reasons  I  am  so  pleased  to  be  here 
this  evening.  The  challenge  of  an  audience  and  of  a  title 
such  as 'this  is  a  welcome  spur  to  r~flection~_ 
It  gives  me  the  chance  to  consider  a  range  of 
issues  together,  to  think  through  my  ideas  on  some  of  the 
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problems  facing  the  Community  and  to  make  suggestions  on 
where  we  ought  to  be  going.  My  choice  is  determined  partly 
by  what  I  regard  as  important,  partly  by  my  own  expertise 
and  experience  and  partly  by  a  desire  to  draw  attention 
to  certain  aspects  of  the  Community  which  are  too  often 
overlooked. 
I  start  from  the  proposition  that  if  Europe  is  to 
rise  to  the  challenge  of  the  eighties  its  inspiration 
must  be  those  words  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome  enjoining  us  to 
work  towards  "closer  relations  between  the  Member  States" 
and  "  ever  closer  union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe";  ·..ords 
surely  even  more  valid  now  than  when  they  were  written. 
At  that  time  memories  of  the  war  were  still  fresh 
and  the  postwar  reconstruction  was  still being  completeJ • 
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Adenauer,  Schuman,  de  Gasperi  and  the  other  founding  fathers 
were  determined  that  Europe  should  be  spared  the  horrors 
of  wa~  and  its  consequential  social  and  economic  disruption 
through  which  they  had  lived.  They  were  also  determined 
that  Europe  should  PlaY  its part  in  helping  the  world  to 
avoid  those  experiences  as  well.  As  it  happened,  however, 
the  years  during  which  the  foundations  of  the  Community  were 
laid  turned  out  to  be  a  golden  age  of  political  stability 
and  economic  progress  throughout  the  West.  Those  of  us 
who  lived  through  them  did  not  think  so  at  the  time  but 
in  retrospect  they  seem  so. 
The  credit  should  go  above  alt  to  the  United  States 
for  the  responsible  way  in  which  it  used  the  strategic  and 
economic  domination  which  it  then  enjoyed.  It  safeguarded 
the  defence  of  Europe  and  many  other  parts  of  the  world 
as  well.  It  underpinned  the  Bretton  Woods  system  of 
international  monetary  relations  based  on  fixed  but 
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adjustable  exchange  rates.  It  also  provided  the  impetus 
for  the  various  arrangements  made  under  the  auspices  of 
GATT  to  dismantle  protectionism  and  encourage  the  freedom 
of  international  trade. 
Two  other  factors  characterise  this  period  as  well: 
the  abundance  of  cheap  energy,  above  all  oil  and  the 
general  moderation  of  wage  demands.  As  a  result  governments 
throughout  the  West  were  able  to  ~ursue  high  employment 
policies  and  to  provide  an  ever-rising  level  of  social 
benefits. 
In  this  warm  and  favourable  international  climate 
the  Community  passed  its  infancy.  The  Common  Agricultural 
Policy  and  the  Common  Market  were  established.  The 
institutions  took  root  and  the  habits  of  cooperation  were 
formed.  As  we  in  Britain discovered  to  our  cost  these 
developments  enabled  you  to  derive  more  advantage  from  the 
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prevailing  circumstances  and  to  move  ahead  faster  than  those 
of  us  who  were  not  members.  Unfortunately,  however,  the 
storm  clouds  gathered  as  the  first  Enlargement  negotiations 
unfolded  and  the  storm  broke  soon  after  their  completion. 
US  economic  domination  gave  way  before  the 
rise  of  Europe  and  Japan.  In  itself  this  was  of  course  a 
good  thing.  But  we  failed  to  develop  an  effective 
collective  leadership  to  replace  the  old  hegemony.  In  many. 
countries  social  expectations  and  demands  began  to  outrun 
economic  growth  leading  to  high  inflation  and  the  disruption 
of  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  At  the  same  time  exports  from 
Japan  and  the  newly  industrialised  countries  started  to 
threaten  industries  on  which  large-scale  employment  in 
Europe  and  the  United  ~tates depends,  thereby  provoking 
demands  for  protectionism.  All  these  trends  were  then  made 
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infinitely  worse  and  more  difficult  to  deal  with  by  the 
two  massive  increases  in oil  prices. 
Thus  we  now  find  outselves  living  in  a  world 
in  which  the  fabric  of  our  domestic  societies  and  of 
our  international  relations  is  pulled  so  taut  that  at  any 
moment  it  could  tear  apart.  We  are  threatened  by  a 
combination  of  economic  and  social  problems  so  contradictory 
that,as  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  Mr  Gordon 
Richardson  recently  observed  ''the  textbooks  used  not  to 
· acknowt'edge  that  they  could  co-exist".  The  basis  of 
international  monetary  relations  has  been  swept  away, 
the·0pen  tradin9  system  is  threatened  by  demands  for 
protectionism  and  the  international  strategic  situation  is 
more  menacing  than  for  a  long  time. 
So  now  the  Community  must  show  what  it  is  made  of. 
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Can  it  provide  a  framework  within  which  we  can  jointly 
tackle  our  economic  problems  and  so  the  social  and 
political difficulties  that  flow  from  them?  Can  we  make  it 
the  basis  from  which  to  bring  our  joint  influence  to  bear 
on  international  economic,  political  and  even  strategic 
problems?  The  challenge  which  the  founding  fathers  foresaw 
has  come  later  than  they  might  have  expected.  We  were  given 
time  to  consolidate  before  having  to  face  it.  Goethe 
tells  us  that  "Genius  develops  in  quiet  places,  character 
out  in  the  full  current  of  human  life".  Our  founding 
fathers  and  those  who  followed  them  such  as  Walter  Hallstein, 
the  first  President  of  the  Commission,  provided  the  genius. 
Now  that  the  test  is  on  us  it  is  up  to  us  to  supply  the 
character. 
The  first  essential  is  that  the  Member  States 
acting  within  a  Community  framework  should  set  themselves 
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common  objectives,  identify  their  individual  interests 
with  those  of  the  whole  and  be  prepared  to  help  each  other 
in  diff~culty.  This  in  turn  means  that  all  must  be  equally 
involved  in all  the  policies  that  are  undertaken. 
In  the  short  term, 'Europe  a  la  carte'  has 
attract.ions,especially  for-jmpat_ient  heads  of  government 
.  - - --- -- - .  , 
anxious  to  see  quick  results  or·to  avoid  difficulties  at 
home.  It  means  that  those  Member  States  which  want  to 
work  together  on  something  and  are  ready  to  do  so  can  move 
ahead  without  waiting  for  others.  By  the  same  token  those 
which  have  difficulty  in  doing  so  can  opt  out.  How  much 
easier .it  all  sounds  than  the  endless  negotiations  that 
at  pre•ent  attend  the  birth  and  implementation  of  Community 
policies. 
Out  in  the  longer  term,  and  not  very  long  at  that, 
such  an  approach  would  destroy  the  whole  Community  ideal • 
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If  the  Member  States  become  free  to  choose  which  policies 
to  participate  in  and  which  not,  they  will  soon  join  in 
only  those  from  which  they  expect  to  derive  tangible 
benefits.  By  the  same  token  governments  will  increasingly 
tend  only  to  work  with  those  of  their  partners  with  whom 
cooperation  is  easy  and  not  with  the  rest.  The  concept  of 
working,  negotiating  and  conciliatingtogether  to  widen  the 
area  of  common  activity  and  range  of  common  purposes 
will  die.  As  it  does  so  the  Community  will  disintegrate 
into  a  collection  of  overlapping  inter-state  relationships. 
As  such  it  could  provide  neither  the  framework  for  common 
internal  action  nor  the  basis  for  external  initiatives 
that  the  founding  fathers  envisaged  and  the  times  demand. 
Let  me  illustrate  this  point  by  considering  first 
the  internal  market,  one  of  our  earliest  and  greatest 
achievements.  By  definition  it  could  not  have  yielded  its 
benefits  if  individual  Member  States  had  been  able  to  opt 
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out  when  it suited thea.  The  certai,.q  of ~tariff-free 
,: .. 
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J 
access t' the  whole  "espace  commercial••  if  1  might  call  it  that 
was  essential  to  encourage  the  enormous  capital  investments 
that  proyide  the  jobs  and  generate  the  rapid  growth  of 
i 
I  •  ,  intra-Co.munlty trade  on  which  so  much  of  our  earlier 
prosperity  was  based.  If the protectionist  demands  of 
! 
special  ~nterest groups  in various  Member  States  had  been 
accepted  j6bs  would  have  been  saved  in  the  short  run.  But  the 
i 
i 
longer  t:erm  cost  in eaptoyment  opportunities,  wealth  and 
greater  consumer  choice  would  have  been  enormous.  Moreover 
it  often~turned out  that  those  who  were  most  fearful  of 
enhanced  competition  at  the  outset  proved  to  be  the  most 
dynamic  both  in  Cor~aunity and  world  markets  when  forced  to 
face  up  to  it. 
What  was  true  then  is  true  now.  So  the  Commission 
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is  determined  to  ensure  thatiiffering  health,  safety, 
technical  and  environmental  standards  should  not  be  allowed 
to  take  the  place  of  tariffs  as  barriers  to  trade.  We  are 
also  determined  - and  I  speak  as  the  responsible  Commissioner  -
to  create  a  common  market  in  financial  services,  notably 
at  first  banking  and  insurance,  to  take  its place  alongside 
that  of  goods.  Some  of  those  even  in  the  Federal  Republic 
who  were  most  enthusiastic  about  the  original  aim  are  among 
the  more  reserved  on  this  one.  But  th~  imbalance  is  contrarv 
to  the  Treaty,  unjust  to  those  who  would  gain  from  the 
elimination  of  barriers  both  as  buyers  and  sellers  and  an 
obstacle  to  increasing  the  competitivity  on  world  markets 
both  of  our  financial  sector  and  of  those  who  use  its 
services. 
Another ·anomaly  that  I  think  needs  to  be  tackled  is  the 
practice  of  so  many  Community  governments  of  directly  or 
indirectly  forcing  their  departments  and  institutions  which 
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are  dependent  on  them  to  buy  only  the  local  product. 
Publi~i proc~~ement  now  accounts  for  some  10%  of  Community 
Gross  Domestic  Product  and  often  has  a  determining  role 
in  the  introduction  of  new  technologies  in  areas  such  as 
telecommunications,  data-processing,  energy  and  transport. 
If  we  are  to  compete  successfully  against  the  United  States 
and  Japan  the  public  procurement  programmes  of  our  ten 
governments  must  be  established  on  the  basis  of  common 
--
criter'ia  and .thrown  <?P_en  _to  companies  from  all  Member  States. 
i 
They  should  be  designed  and  regulated  in  such  a  way  as  to 
secure  the possibility of  benefits  for  the  industries 
concerned  on  a  Europe-wide  basis.  The  achievement  of  this 
aim  will  require  careful  negotiations  as  each  Member  State 
must  feel  that  in  opening  up  its market  it  is  securing 
commensurate  opportunit~es for  its  national  companies 
in  others. 
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I  believe  better  coordination  of  government  procurement  in 
the  industrial  sector  particularly  in  the  high  technology 
industries .should  have  implications  for  defence  and  for  the 
defence  industries.  The  same  governments  and  the  same 
companies  are  involved.  If  European  industry  receives  the 
benefit  of  coordinated  government  procurement 
programmes  in  the  civil  field,  it  is  likely  to  seek  it  in  the 
defence  field  as  well.  And  if  governments  are  able  to 
coordinate  their  civil  procurement  programmes  more  effectively 
they  may  well  see  attraction  in .extending  the  process  to 
their  defence  programmes.  All  European  countries,  even 
those  most  dedicated  to  the  Western  Alliance  are  having 
difficulty  funding  their  defence  programmes  and  such  a  move 
could·do  much  to  enable  them  to  fulfil  their  defence 
obligations  more  effectively  than  at  present  despite 
budgetary  constraints. 
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In  any  case  the  division  between  defence  and  civil 
industrial  technology  is  blurred.  Much  of  the  defence 
equipm~nt  that  is  needed  today  involves  technology  which 
pushes  at  the  limits  of  scientific  and  engineering 
development.  In  the  aero-space,  electronics  and  shipbuilding 
industries,  to  name  only  three,  defence  provides  both  a  major-
source  of  orders  - 60%  of  aircraft  industry  sales  within  the 
Community  for  instance  - and  thus  an  essential  stimulus  to 
the  technological  advance  that  is  essential  if  they  are  to 
remainicompetitive  on  world  markets. 
Unlike  the  Common  Market  the  European  Monetary 
System  had  to  be  established  on  a  partial  basis  because  of 
British  reluctance  fully  to  participate.  I  believe  that 
once  it  had  become  clear  that  the  choice  lay  between  going 
ahead  without  Britain  in  the  exchange  rate  arrangements  or 
not  at  all  that it  was  right  to  proceed.  Their  success 
in  creating  a  -zone  Of  ·relative  monetary  stability  in  which 
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when  necessary  adjustments  to  central  rates  have  been 
carried  through  smoothly,  promptly  and  without  disruption 
to  markets,  is  proof  of  that.  By  contrast  the  wide 
fluctuations  in  the  exchange  rate  of  the  pound  and  the 
effects  these  have  had  on  British  interest  rates  show  how 
mistaken  Britain  was  to  remain  outside.  I  will  continue 
to  press  my  compatriots  to  join  both  for  their  own  sake  and 
in  the  wider  European  interest. 
The  further  development  of  EMS  to  the  extent  that 
it  is  needed  to  defend  Europe's  vital  interests  in  inter-
national  monetary  matters  requires  the  full  participation 
of  all  Member  States.  The  events  of  the  last  few  months 
have  shown  that  despite  our  success  in  bringing  order  to 
the  relationships  between  our  own  currencies  we  are  still 
very  much  at  the  mercy  of  what  happens  in  the  United  States. 
Because  of  American  policies  we  have  been  forced  to  raise 
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our  interest  rates  to  levels  that  are  damaging  to  our 
• 
economies  and  the  pressures  on  our  ex~hange  rates  have 
been  intense. 
We  desperately  need  to  find  more  effective  ways 
of  influencing  the  Americans  on  the  one  hand  and  of  counter-
acting  the  effects  of  their  policies  on  the  other  when  these 
run  counter  to  our  interests.  So  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  01 
the  matter  let  me  make  it quite  clear  that  I  believe  the 
best  way  to  conduct  international  monetary  relations  and 
indeed  all  other  types  of  international  relations  is  in 
cooperation  with  the  United  States  and  not  in  opposition  to 
it.  But  such  cooperation  in  this  field  as  in  others  that 
1  shall  touch  on  later  in  my  speech  is  more  likely  to  occur 
if  we  can  function  as  a  block  of  comparable  weight  rather 
than  as  disunited  entities.The  incomplete  participation  in  our 
system  of  one  of  the  major  European  currencies  and  the 
uncertainty  this  creates  about  how  it  will  be  managed 
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both  in  relation  t~  its partners  and  external  currencies 
is  therefore  a  significant  point  of  weakness. 
The  most  pressing  need  is  for  our  individual 
national  economic  and  monetary  policies  to  be  discussed 
more  systematically  in  advance  at  Community  level  and  to  be 
more  intensively  coordinated.  Those  who  advocate  most 
strongly  a  united  front  to  the  outside  often  tend  to  forget 
that  this  is  an  essential  precondition  to  external  success. 
On  the  external  front  I  would  like  to  see  the 
establishment  of  a  coordinated  system  of  intervention  by 
the  Community  viz  a  viz  the  dollar  and  other  major  currencies. 
Though  this  does  not  require  the  creation  of  a  European 
Monetary  Fund  the  operation  would,  I  think,  be  facilitated 
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if  such  a  body  could  be  set  up.  An  EMF  as  was  of  course 
originally envisagedfor  the  second  stage  of  EMS  would  in 
any  case  be  needed  if  we  are  to ~ake the  p~ogress !_regard 
as  essential  towards  establishing  the  ECU  as  an 
international  reserve  currency.  Until  the  world  has  an 
alternative  store  of  monetary  value  to  the  dollar  - apart 
of  course  from  gold- it  will  be  extremely  difficult  to 
counter  the  effects  on  national  exchange  and  interest 
rates  of  large  movements  of  funds  into  and  out  of  the 
dollar. 
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Neither the internal market nor the  EMS  involve 
expenditure programmes.  Perhaps  that is why 
'  they have  engendered  fewer  disputes  than the  Budget, 
another area of Community  activity where  I  have 
direct responsibilities. 
In recent years  disputes  between Member 
States and between the  Community  institutions -
Council,  Parliament and Commission  - arising out of 
the  Budget have been creating increasingly serious 
tensions.  Those  involving the states have  dominated 
European Councils,  while because of the latter the 
Budget has  been rejected by  the European Parliament 
or had its legality challenged by Member  States in 
each of the last three years.  As  the  Budget is the 
point where  the interests of the Member  States and 
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the competences of the institutions meet  and  rub 
against each other,  a  certain friction is inevitable. 
But we  have  now  reached a  point where unless  the 
.. 
Community  Budget is put on to  a  better footing, 
the disputes it engenders  could do  irreparable 
damage.  Indeed,  I  fear  they  could  jeopardise the 
far-reaching ideas for European political development 
that are currently being put forward in this country 
and elsewhere. 
The  nub of the problem derives  from  the 
imbalance between agricultural expenditure and  the 
rest.  '!he  Community  Budget,  like. any other,  is a 
mechanism by  which political aspirations and  decisions 
are given .the practical form which enables  them  to  be 
carried into effect.  This does  not mean  that a  large 
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Budget is good  and a  small  one  bad.  Far from it. 
The  size of a  budget must  depend on a  Whole  variety 
of political and economic  circumstances.  But  the 
range of policies it covers  and  the balance  between 
them is as  good  an indicator of  the political 
priorities of  those Who  draw it up,  or at least of 
their ability to agree  on  those priorities,  as  can 
be  found. 
The  present structure of  the  Community 
Budget reflects a  two~fold failure on the part of 
the Community.  On  the one hand, it shows  that not 
enough has  been done  to bring agricultural expenditure 
under proper control:  on the other,  and of more 
importance, it indicates how  little progress has 
been made  towards  other common  expenditure policies 
and  so  towards  implementing  a  common  purpose in 
..  / .. ·many  fi:elxts,.  If :t:!lit'e ~ty  is to have a  real 
~ct  :ln h~l;fJin,g lJA:e  ~ber  States to overcome 
current ':economic  p:r6blcems,  I  cannot believe that 
agriculture should be the only significant: example 
of a  ~cmm:ron  e~~tll.d:lture  co11'1monly  financed.  This is 
not to say that  ~ll.i~i,e:s for dealing with unemployment, 
and the like should  be  financed wholly or even mainly 
through  th.e  CoTmt\unity.  In the present circumstances 
that would  be absurd.  And  in any  case  important 
·aspects of  them will no  doubt:  ~lways be  best handled 
at national level.  But declarations  c;>f  intent by 
Governments  about working  together to achieve  common 
objectives can mean  anything or nothing.  Even 
undertakings  to co-ordinate national policies can 
all too easily be forgotten in  times  of stress. 
An element of Community  finance is essential. 
.. / .. 
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For policy issues involving expenditure, 
the  Community  Budget  provides  the best way  of 
ensuring that all Member  States fully participate 
both in setting objectives and working  towards  them 
on a  continuing basis.  Common  policies commonly 
financed may  account for only a  modest  proportion 
of the total expenditure by  the Member  States in 
the fields in question.  But  they form  the arches 
that link together the various national edifices 
and make  possible  the  long  and difficult process 
of fitting the national policies together in a 
coherent and mutually compatible  form.  The  greater 
the range of policies included in the  Budget,  the 
greater the  scope will be  for widening  the  range 
of common  objectives pursued by  the Member  States  • 
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Three principles will however,  in my 
view,  have  to be observed.  Firstly,  common  policies 
must  be worked  out on their own  merits  on the basis 
of the  Community  interest.  They  should not be 
determined either in order to yield particular results 
for a  particular country or to offset the  consequences 
of another policy.  If these considerations  become 
paramount,  they will  turn into a  mish-mash of 
distortions  and anomalies.  Secondly, if a  group  of 
countries with disparate economies at various  stages 
of development is to work  together  towards  common 
objectives,  the richer will have  to accept an element 
of re-distribution in favour of  the poorer. 
.  ./  .. - 25  -
Thirdly, it will be necessary to 
build in safeguards  to assure Member  States 
that their contributions  to  the  common  cause 
do  not develop unfairly in relation to others 
nor run out of control.  This is bound  to be 
a  subject of interest to the Federal Republic. 
For my  part, as  Budget  Commissioner for the 
last four years,  I  would  like to  say how 
conscious  I  am  of  the scale of Germany's 
\ 
contribution and of the political effort required 
to sustain it. 
../  .. 26  -
Before leaving the Budget,  I  would  like 
to make  one other point.  Only in the Budget 
procedure does  the  European Parliament have real 
powers  that cannot be  bypassed or ignored.  Thus 
the greater the'range of policies carried out in 
part through the Budget,  the greater will be  the 
role and influence of the Parliament in the 
Community's affairs.  If, of course,  Parliament 
is given new  powers,  its position could be  enhanced 
in other ways.  I  would like to  see that.  Nevertheless 
constitutional history shows  that in the  end it is 
the power  to pass or reject budgets  that constitutes 
the most  important single power of Parliaments. 
This is not because  budgets either are,or should be, 
rejected,  except on very rare occasions;  it is 
because  the passage of  a  budget  enables  a  Parliament 
to bring influence to bear on the scale of policies, 
their direction and their mix. 
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Everything  I  have said so far has  been 
designed  to give practical effect to  the "closer 
relations between Member  States" and  the  "ever 
closer union of European peoples" that I  believe 
is essential if we  are  to rise to the challenge 
of the  1980s.  I  have also had in mind  the wise 
words  of that great British Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest  Bevin,  who  used  to tell his followers  that 
success in foreign policy depended a  great deal on 
the effectiveness of  the industrial  and economic 
policies that underlay  them.  The  matters  about 
which  I  have  spoken this evening are not  just 
important in themselves.  They  also form  the basis 
on which  the·ideas now  circulating for enhancing 
the  Community's  collective foreign policy voice 
will have  to be built. 
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These ideas,  some  of the most valuable 
of which have originated in the Federal Republic, 
should in my  view constitute the next great wave 
of European development.  Opinion will no  doubt 
differ from one capital to another on how  they 
should be  implemented and  the extent to which 
the  Community's  constitutional arrangements 
should be altered.  I  hope  that these arguments 
will not lose sight of the central point,  which 
is to ensure that Europe  can make  a  distinctive 
contribution on issues which concern our vital 
interests and play an effective role in influencing 
and partnering the United States.  If we  cannot 
bring our collective weight  and  solidarity to bear 
in international relations,  our individual voices 
will not g.et much  of a  hearing. 
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The  strengthening of Political Co-operation 
will inevitably lead to a  broadening of the areas of 
activity which it encompasses.  In particular, it 
seems  clear that there will be  a  greater readiness 
to discuss issues of security policy and it has  been 
suggested that this in turn may  lead to  a  degree of 
Community  involvement in the defence field. 
As  far as  a  security policy is concerned, 
it is of course natural that when Ministers of 
Community  Governments  discuss  the problems  facing 
them,  they  should devote  an important part of their 
time  to the  problems of their own  continent and in 
particular to East/West relations.  They  have  indeed 
begun to do  so already.  One  of the first successes 
of Political Co-operation was  the  achievement of a 
common  European approach  to  the  Conference  on 
Security and  Co-operation iri Europe. 
../  .. There are, moreover,  good  reasons  why 
the countries of the Community  should discuss 
together certain security issues.  Arms  control, 
for example,  has  a  particularly European dimension 
both because of the spe.cial  situation of the 
Western European countries vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union by comparison with the situation of the 
united States;  and because  there are in many 
European societies domestic pressures and concerns, 
as recent events in this country have  shown, 
which are not shared on the other side of the 
Atlantic.  This does not mean  that the Connnunity, 
by discussing such i.ssues,  would attach any  less 
importance to the discussions which  take place in 
the North Atlantic Alliance.  On  the contrary,  a 
common  understanding among  Community  Governments 
can often serve to help discussions in the wider 
NATO  forum. 
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To  suggest developments  along  these lines 
is not  to imply that the  Community  need  suddenly 
acquire a  new  defence dimension involving a  radical 
change in Western Europe's  security institutions. 
Nine  out of the existing ten Members  of the  Community 
already share  a  common  security policy which is based 
on their membership  of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
Of  the  two  acceding countries,  one is already a 
member  of the Alliance and  the other seems  to be 
on the verge of  joining it.  But  such defence 
problems  as  the proper balance between military 
capability and  arms  control,  the  need for more 
cost-effective use of defence  resources  and  questions 
concerning  the deployment of particular types of 
weapon,  touch all the peoples of Europe very directly  • 
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War, it was  once  said, is too  important 
to be left to generals.  By  the  same  token, matters 
'relating to  the prevention of war are  too important 
•  to be excluded from  the European  Conmru.ni ty.  After 
all, the prevention of war between European peoples 
was  one of the principal objectives of  those who 
conceived and  launched the European idea.  In an 
appropriate form,  and bearing in mind  the interests 
of those who  depend  on us,  and  those on whom  we 
depend,  the  Community  must  cover whatever is 
essential to the well-being of its peoples. 
So  I  return to where  I  began:  to  the vision 
of a  European Community  that can provide  a  framework 
within which we  tackle our internal problems  and  a 
basis from which we  can make  our influence felt in 
the world.  But let us  never forget  that we  are not 
just in the business of economics  or even of politics. 
The  Community has  a  higher purpose  than both  • 
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Our  task as we  build Europe is to  show 
that the values  on which our societies are based 
can fulfil  their promise.  We  must  show  that in 
economic  terms  they can provide our citizens with 
a  wide  range of career opportunities  to develop 
and use  their talents.  We  must  show that in 
freedom  and  tolerance men  and women  can best 
develop  their full potential as human  beings 
and  the more  generous  aspects of  the human 
character.  We  must  show,  finally,  that within 
our society there is the best chance for most 
people  to  enjoy peace of mind  and happiness. 